Tribing in Politics: Belonging, Power, and the Ethiopian–Tigrayan Experience

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Introduction                                                         

Politics is not only a contest of institutions and policies but also of identities and emotions. The phenomenon of tribing, the act of forming political solidarity around shared identity rather than shared argument or material interest, has gained renewed attention in contemporary political theory. Unlike issue-based or deliberative models of politics that prioritize argument and negotiation, tribing relies on belonging, loyalty, and affect. It is about who we are rather than what we think. This feature makes it both a powerful mobilizing tool and a dangerous source of division.

The mobilizing force of tribing has been observed across contexts, from anti-colonial struggles to contemporary populist movements. Yet its dangers are equally evident: suppression of dissent, polarization, and the instrumentalization of identity by elites. This article examines the philosophy, history, and political implications of tribing, comparing it with rational deliberation, class-based politics, and issue-driven mobilization. It argues that tribing is a double-edged sword: indispensable for creating solidarity under conditions of threat, but corrosive for long-term reconciliation and democratic renewal when it closes space for pluralism.

To ground this theoretical discussion, the article includes a focused case study on Tigray. Drawing on the debates on Tigrayan social media about the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), the case illustrates both the strengths and dangers of tribing. On the one hand, the debate shows how identity-based framing can fortify a community under existential threat by insisting on justice before return. On the other, it demonstrates how tribing can silence dissent, overshadow humanitarian concerns, and intensify polarization. This example underscores the central argument of the paper: tribing in politics is not merely an abstract theoretical concern but a lived and urgent reality with profound consequences for survival, justice, and peace.

Tribing and Alternative Models of Politics

Tribing stands in sharp contrast to other political models. Rational deliberative politics, rooted in Habermas’s theory of communicative action, envisions citizens as participants in reasoned dialogue, where consensus emerges through the “force of the better argument” (Habermas, 1996). Tribing, however, resists rational persuasion, as loyalty to the group often outweighs logic or evidence.

Class-based politics, central to Marxist traditions, structures political life around material relations of production, workers versus capitalists. Yet tribing often cuts across class boundaries. Wealthy and poor members of the same ethnic or religious group may unite in opposition to outsiders, undermining class solidarity (Laclau, 2005).

Issue-based politics, found in many advanced democracies, builds loyalty around policies such as healthcare, taxation, or climate change. Tribing, by contrast, tends to sideline concrete issues in favor of existential struggles of identity. As Lipset and Rokkan (1967) observed, political “cleavages” are often more about identity than about policy.

These contrasts demonstrate that tribing cannot be dismissed as primitive or irrational; rather, it is a distinctive and resilient form of political organization. Its strength lies in mobilization, but its limitations emerge in governance. This duality becomes particularly stark in societies facing existential threats, as the Ethiopian–Tigrayan case reveals.

The Merits and Demerits of Tribing

As mentioned earlier, the power of tribing lies in its capacity to mobilize. People are often willing to sacrifice more for identity than for policy goals, and this loyalty can sustain long-term resistance movements. Anti-colonial struggles across Africa, including Ethiopia’s resistance to Italian occupation, were driven not primarily by policy platforms but by identity and belonging (Clapham, 2018). In fragmented societies, identity-based politics provides emotional resonance and coherence, offering meaning where state institutions are weak (Anderson, 1983). For marginalized groups, tribing becomes a strategy of survival and protection, preserving culture and resisting assimilation (Mamdani, 1996).

Yet the same qualities that empower tribing also make it perilous. Its reliance on an “us versus them” logic fosters polarization, hostility, and sometimes violent conflict. Internal dissent is often suppressed, as critics risk being labeled traitors. Tribing can also produce policy blindness, where citizens support leaders out of loyalty even when governance fails. Its emotive appeal further leaves societies vulnerable to elite manipulation, as leaders exploit identity loyalties to consolidate power while deflecting accountability (Chabal & Daloz, 1999).

The Ethiopian–Tigrayan experience provides a striking demonstration of both these merits and demerits. It shows how tribing can be both emancipatory and destructive, protective and corrosive. Ethiopia’s ethnic federalist system, institutionalized in the 1995 constitution, codified identity as the basis of political belonging (Abbink, 1997). For the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), tribing was both a survival strategy and a source of power. In the 1970s and 1980s, the TPLF mobilized Tigrayan identity to resist the Derg regime, creating solidarity that enabled a small region to defeat a central military dictatorship (Young, 1997).

Yet the success of Tigrayan tribing also sowed seeds of future conflict. Once in power, the TPLF used ethnic solidarity to suppress internal dissent, while Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism fragmented the polity into competing identity blocs. By the time of the Tigray War (2020–2022), tribing had transformed political disagreements into existential battles. For many Tigrayans, survival meant absolute loyalty; for the federal government and allied groups, defeating “the Tigrayan tribe” became a national project. The result was catastrophic destruction and mass suffering (Gebremedhin, 2022). Even within Tigray today, divisions between zones—South, Central, and Western—illustrate how tribing can fracture into smaller units, undermining the solidarity it once sustained. What began as an emancipatory force has thus become a source of fragmentation.

The dangers of tribing are not unique to Ethiopia. By reinforcing an “us versus them” logic, it can lead to polarization, hostility, and even civil war. Yugoslavia’s collapse in the 1990s and Rwanda’s genocide in 1994 are grim reminders of this dynamic (Mamdani, 2001). Within the tribe, dissent is suppressed as internal critics are cast as traitors, stifling democratic pluralism and narrowing political discourse. Tribing also encourages policy blindness: citizens may support leaders who fail economically or socially simply because they represent the tribe. In the United States, partisan tribalism has been shown to make voters prioritize party loyalty over personal interest (Mason, 2018). Communities may even back policies that undermine their long-term interests. For instance, Tigrayans supported the Ethiopian constitution largely because it was advanced by a coalition dominated by the TPLF; here, identity loyalty overshadowed a careful assessment of how the framework entrenched their permanent minority status. The blindness lies in mistaking representation by “our group” for genuine empowerment.

Finally, tribing leaves societies vulnerable to elite manipulation. Leaders exploit group loyalties to consolidate power, redirecting grievances outward while deflecting accountability (Chabal & Daloz, 1999).

Case Study: Tigrayan IDPs and Tribing

To illustrate my points, I will focus on the ongoing debate in Tigrayan social media over whether internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Western Tigray, who were forced to flee their homes during the genocidal war of November 2020, should be allowed to decide for themselves if and when they wish to return. In his opinion piece The Danger of Forcing a Choice Under Duress: Rejecting the Premature Return of Displaced Tigrayans, published on UMD Media, Mersea Kidan categorically rejects proposals that displaced Tigrayans should be granted such a choice while their homes remain under the control of occupying forces. He argues that framing return as a matter of free will under these conditions is deceptive, since displacement in the context of occupation and trauma cannot be considered voluntary. For him, premature return would not only re-traumatize survivors but also serve the political agenda of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who could use the appearance of resolution to mask the persistence of occupation and injustice.

Viewed through the lens of tribing, the strength of Mersea’s piece lies in its ability to transform a humanitarian question into an existential struggle for national survival. It ties the fate of displaced persons to the integrity of the Tigrayan nation itself, converting individual suffering into a collective political imperative. By presenting unity as non-negotiable and compromise as betrayal, his opinion piece strengthens group solidarity at a moment of vulnerability. This illustrates the emotional and mobilizing power of tribing, as described by Maffesoli (1996) and Tajfel and Turner (1979), where identity is sharpened through the creation of a stark distinction between “us” and “them.”

Yet Mersea’s argument also highlights the limitations of tribing. By insisting that only one stance is legitimate, it delegitimizes dissent within the Tigrayan community. Those who suggest even considering return under occupation are portrayed as enablers of disintegration. While this narrowing of the debate may build short-term cohesion, it risks silencing internal diversity and excluding voices motivated by immediate humanitarian concerns. As Habermas (1996) warns in his theory of deliberative democracy, foreclosing dialogue in this way undermines the conditions for rational will-formation. Moreover, framing the issue exclusively in terms of survival heightens polarization, leaving little space for compromise or pragmatic solutions.

By foregrounding collective identity, Mersea’s position—and those who agree with it—also risks overshadowing the concrete humanitarian needs of displaced persons. Concerns such as health, shelter, psychological recovery, children’s education, and livelihood restoration recede behind the symbolic weight of preserving unity. This dynamic reflects what Mamdani (1996) identified in African politics as the subordination of the individual to the logic of the community, where a person is seen primarily as a bearer of group identity. In this way, tribing provides moral clarity but obscures the granular realities that humanitarian responses, such as those outlined in the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998), are designed to address.

Finally, the opinion piece demonstrates how tribing can consolidate authority in the hands of elites who present themselves as guardians of survival. By framing unity as absolute and dissent as betrayal, such arguments allow the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) leadership to invoke existential threats as a way of legitimizing their authority and shielding themselves from accountability. This underscores the double-edged nature of tribing: while it protects a community under threat, it also risks constraining political imagination and entrenching power asymmetries.

The debate over Tigrayan IDPs therefore illustrates both the mobilizing strengths and the corrosive dangers of tribing in politics. On one hand, it fortifies a community against external manipulation and insists on justice before return. On the other, it narrows the space for internal debate, prioritizes identity over humanitarian realities, and fosters polarization. As such, this case demonstrates that while tribing may be indispensable in moments of existential threat, it can also hinder long-term reconciliation and democratic renewal if left unchecked.

Conclusion

Tribing is one of the most enduring and paradoxical forces in political life. It mobilizes solidarity, provides belonging, and offers meaning in times of crisis. Yet it also carries dangers: the suppression of dissent, the narrowing of debate, the overshadowing of individual needs, and the risk of elite manipulation. Compared with rational deliberation, class-based politics, or issue-driven mobilization, tribing is less capable of producing compromise or policy innovation, but it is unmatched in its capacity to forge loyalty and collective endurance.

The case of Tigrayan IDPs illustrates this duality in stark terms. As Mersea Kidan’s opinion piece in UMD Media and the broader Tigrayan social media debates reveal, tribing can be a vital shield against external manipulation, ensuring that displacement is not normalized under conditions of genocide, occupation and trauma. It transforms a humanitarian question into a collective political imperative, binding the fate of individuals to the survival of the nation. At the same time, it risks foreclosing dialogue within Tigray, reducing complex humanitarian realities to questions of loyalty, and entrenching polarization.

This case study demonstrates that tribing is not an abstract theoretical concept but a lived reality with profound consequences. For Tigrayans today, as for many communities navigating existential threats, tribing is both indispensable and dangerous. The challenge lies not in eliminating it, since belonging is a fundamental human need, but in reshaping it toward more inclusive, pluralistic, and justice-centered forms. Only then can the power of collective identity be harnessed for democratic renewal rather than democratic collapse.

References

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Mason, L. (2018). Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity. University of Chicago Press.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). “An integrative theory of intergroup conflict.” In The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, 33–47.

United Nations. (1998). Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2.

Young, J. (1997). Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People’s Liberation Front, 1975–1991. Cambridge University Press.

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