Information obtained by UMD Media from highly placed political and military sources in Tigray points to growing mistrust inside Tigray’s political and military leadership, intensified by recent battlefield losses, disagreements over relations with Eritrea and what sources describe as a quiet effort to restructure the military chain of command.
At the same time, a highly positioned official who confided in UMD Media describes an atmosphere in which meaningful internal debate has sharply deteriorated, particularly following Proclamation 366/2018 which was passed during a closed session of the Tigray State Council on June 1, 2026.
According to the official, meetings of the TPLF Politburo, Central Committee, Tigray cabinet and senior military leadership increasingly take place without the kind of substantive disagreement expected from decision-making bodies. Officials outside a small core reportedly fear that challenging the prevailing position could expose them to accusations of being "traitors," "working for the enemy," or undermining Tigray at a time of war.
The result, the official said, is widespread self-censorship even among senior political and military figures. That climate of fear is now intersecting with a potentially consequential struggle over who actually controls Tigray’s armed forces.
1. Shererina Losses Expose Internal Divisions
The immediate trigger for some of the latest tension was recent fighting between Tigrayan and Ethiopian federal forces around Shererina.
According to one senior source, the losses included military equipment and weaponry accumulated over years, dozens of vehicles, fighters captured and others killed. The source said bodies of some of those killed were later recovered from a river.
The incident reportedly generated a serious disagreement between General Migbey Haile, commander of the Western Front, and Colonel Tsegay Teka (Tsegay Marx), commander of Army 13.
Among the questions being raised internally is why Army 70 did not provide assistance and why action was apparently not taken despite intelligence reportedly received days earlier warning that federal forces were preparing an attack on the specific position.
A committee has reportedly been dispatched to investigate and initiate its customary process of criticism and self-criticism.
But the controversy reaches beyond the individual battle. It comes as an already divided leadership of the organization and command of Tigray’s military.
2. A New Command Structure
According to UMD Media’s sources, decisions taken in Mekelle approximately two weeks ago began positioning selected army commanders as "deputy front commanders."
The commanders identified by sources include: M. General Abreha Tesfay (aka Dinkul), commander of Army 42; B. General Fisseha Beyene (aka Werqi Aynu), commander of Army 11; General W/Giorgis Teklay (aka Sherifo), commander of Army 33; and General Zenebe Kifle, commander of Army 31.
Sources say the appointments are particularly significant because the position of "deputy front commander," in the form now being introduced, did not previously exist within the established command structure and therefore cannot be understood simply as another routine layer in the military hierarchy.
Their assessment is that the commanders are being inserted into front leadership as an interim arrangement, with the possibility of gradually replacing existing commanders.
Under the configuration described to UMD Media, Werqi Aynu, Dinkul, and potentially General Muzey Mekonnen, commander of Army 70, and General Hintsa W/Giorgis, commander of Army 60, are being positioned around the command currently led by Migbey; Sherifo is reportedly being positioned to succeed or counterbalance South Commander Yohannes W/Giorgis (aka John Medid); and Zenebe is similarly being positioned around Northeast Commander M. General Masho Beyene.
The importance is not merely the appointments themselves. As one source put it, control of the fronts ultimately means control of the armies and forces beneath them.
3. General Fisseha Kidanu and General Haileslassie Girmay
The larger target of the restructuring, according to several sources, is the authority of General Fisseha Kidanu (aka Fisseha Manjus), Tigray’s Defence Forces commander who replaced Taddesse Werede, former Tigray Interim Regional Administration President.
Rather than removing Fisseha Manjus outright, sources believe the strategy is to gradually reduce his operational control by restructuring the command beneath and around him. That assessment gained greater significance following a Tigray cabinet meeting held yesterday that approved a regulation defining the military command structure. According to sources familiar with the deliberations, the regulation places major responsibilities for operations, security and logistics under Deputy Commander General Haileslasie Girmay (aka Wedi Embetey), substantially strengthening his practical authority. Those responsibilities constitute some of the principal instruments through which military power is exercised. Therefore, Fisseha Manjus could remain chief commander formally while losing important elements of actual command.
An expert involved in the deliberations reportedly warned that the regulation appeared to have been designed around particular individuals, rather than establishing neutral institutional authority for the offices of chief and deputy commander.
4. Amanuel Assefa’s Role
Sources identify Amanuel Assefa, Vice President of the Tigray Regional Government and Deputy Chairman of the TPLF, as an important actor in the cabinet debate that produced the new command arrangement.
According to those accounts, Amanuel argued strongly in favour of transferring substantial authority to Wedi Embetey and resisted objections to the proposed distribution of powers.
Sources describe Amanuel as having a strained relationship with Fiseha Manjus and as aligned with Wedi Embetey in the current internal power struggle. They further contend that his position is shaped partly by his own political calculations, preserving his existing influence and potentially expanding it as the balance of power within the political and military leadership changes.
One source characterized Amanuel’s intervention during the cabinet meeting as unusually forceful and said he played an important role in securing approval of the regulation in its present form.
UMD Media has not independently verified these characterizations or the motivations attributed to Amanuel, nor has it obtained responses from Amanuel Assefa, Fisseha Manjus or Wedi Embetey regarding the allegations.
5. The Reported Core Group
Several senior sources describe what they see as a tightly coordinated political-military inner circle consisting of TPLF Chairman Debretsion Gebremichael; TPLF Secretariat Head Fetlework Gebregziabher; Ethiopia’s former intelligence chief and current TPLF Central Committee member Getachew Assefa; Wedi Embetey; and Major General Berhane Negash (Wedi Medhin).
According to the sources, these five figures form the smaller core coordinating the broader political and military objectives behind the ongoing restructuring.
This inner circle should be distinguished from Tigray’s formal Central Command, which has a broader membership. According to the sources, the Central Command includes the five figures above together with Fisseha Manjus, TPLF Politburo member Abraham Tekeste, Amanuel Assefa, General Migbey Haile and John Medid.
The distinction is significant. Although Fiseha Manjus, Migbey Haile and John Medid formally sit within the Central Command, sources describe them as being outside the smaller decision-making circle driving the current restructuring, or as not being fully informed about its ultimate direction. In other words, formal membership in the Central Command does not necessarily mean equal participation in the inner process where, according to the sources, the most consequential decisions are being shaped.
While UMD Media cannot independently establish that the group around Debretsion constitutes a formally organized faction, highly placed sources familiar with the internal deliberations describe the developments more starkly: Debretsion, they say, is effectively engaged in building a military command structure of his own, staffed by commanders whose loyalty he can depend on. Viewed in that context, the dispute extends far beyond rivalries among individual commanders. The central question is whether effective military authority is being gradually shifted away from the existing chain of command and consolidated around a political-military network aligned with Debretsion.
6. Fear Has Changed How Decisions Are Made
The struggle is occurring within a political atmosphere that sources say makes resistance from within increasingly difficult.
A highly positioned official told UMD Media that since the adoption of Proclamation 366/2018, officials have become increasingly cautious about expressing dissent even inside supposedly confidential leadership meetings. Politburo members, Central Committee members, cabinet officials and military commanders may privately disagree with decisions, the source said, but many no longer challenge them openly.
The fear is not simply losing an argument. It is that dissent itself can be interpreted as political disloyalty or, more seriously, as collaboration with an enemy. That dynamic fundamentally changes how institutions function.
A Politburo meeting or a Central Committee meeting without genuine political debate, a cabinet meeting where bureau heads fear questioning proposals, or a military command meeting where officers hesitate to challenge assumptions may retain the appearance of collective decision-making while increasingly concentrating real power among those who define what positions are considered acceptable.
This is particularly dangerous in military affairs. Effective command depends on bad news moving upward, intelligence being challenged and commanders being able to question faulty assumptions before they produce battlefield consequences.
The Shererina losses have therefore become more than a military setback. They are also testing whether Tigray’s current leadership structure remains capable of identifying and correcting its own mistakes.
7. Eritrea and the Direction of the Next Conflict
Behind the command struggle is another unresolved issue, relations with Eritrea.
Senior TPLF leaders, including Debretsion, have publicly acknowledged contacts and developing relations with Eritrea. Eritrean officials, however, have so far made no comparable public acknowledgement of an agreement at a meaningful official level.
Sources say the internal disagreement concerns not simply whether Tigray should communicate with Eritrea but the conditions attached to that relationship.
According to the accounts provided to UMD Media, Eritrea’s overriding concern is preventing another war from moving toward Eritrean territory, while any military assistance could potentially come with influence over where Tigrayan forces fight, whom they fight and toward what strategic objective.
Western Tigray is reportedly among the most sensitive issues, with sources claiming Tigrayan leaders have been discouraged by Eritrea from considering a military attempt to retake the territory.
If accurate, that creates another source of tension inside the military establishment: Tigrayan forces could bear the cost of another confrontation while Tigray’s constitutional territory remains unrestored.
8. Eritrea, Pretoria and a Renewed Diplomatic Push
The absence of any public acknowledgement from Eritrea of its developing relationship with the TPLF may itself be significant. President Isaias Afwerki has long employed strategic ambiguity in Eritrea’s involvement in regional conflicts, preserving room to shift alliances or distance himself from partners as circumstances change.
Sources who spoke to UMD Media see another possible advantage for Asmara: allowing the TPLF to carry the political burden of escalation. Under this interpretation, the TPLF itself could take the steps that finally break what remains of the political framework connecting Tigray with Addis Ababa, principally the Pretoria Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, while Eritrea remains formally outside the confrontation.
The further the TPLF moves away from Pretoria, the argument goes, the more dependent it could become on Eritrea for military and strategic support, potentially increasing Isaias’s leverage over Tigray while preserving his own freedom to change course.
That concern became particularly relevant during the TPLF’s "Never to National Destruction" forums across Tigray in July. Senior leaders repeatedly spoke of "burying the PP regime" and declared that diplomatic avenues had been exhausted.
The forums coincided with intense diplomatic activity. U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia Ervin Massinga visited Mekelle on July 15, publicly emphasizing dialogue and full implementation of the Pretoria agreement. UMD Media was subsequently told by sources that a planned follow-up visit was cancelled during the height of the forums. Separately, reports at the time said a scheduled meeting between Massinga and former Tigray Interim Regional Administration President Lt. Gen. Tadesse Werede was prevented on July 15.
Then, on August 24, former Nigerian President and African Union High Representative for the Horn of Africa Olusegun Obasanjo arrived unexpectedly in Mekelle. Tigray authorities themselves subsequently said the visit had not been arranged in advance. Obasanjo met Debretsion Gebremichael during the visit.
Sources who spoke to UMD Media said Debretsion met Obasanjo at a hotel and that the former Nigerian president conveyed three central demands: an unconditional resumption of talks with the federal government, distancing the TPLF from Eritrea, and reinstating the Tigray Interim Regional Administration formerly headed by Tadesse Werede.
Diplomatic sources told UMD Media that these demands broadly reflected the position of the United States.
UMD Media has not independently verified the details of what Obasanjo privately communicated to Debretsion. Ambassador Massinga and the U.S. Mission to the African Union described Obasanjo’s role as critical and called for his early return, while emphasizing compromise and the need to return displaced people safely and with dignity.
The European Union and a broad group of Western diplomatic missions subsequently issued a joint statement expressing "great concern" over developments in northern Ethiopia, urging all parties to engage constructively and in good faith in implementing the Pretoria agreement and explicitly welcoming Obasanjo’s meetings in Addis Ababa and Mekelle.
9. Tigray Leadership Gives a Different Account
The following day, however, the Tigray Communication Affairs Bureau presented a markedly different characterization of Obasanjo’s visit.
Its August 25 statement acknowledged that Obasanjo had arrived unexpectedly and without a prior appointment but said Tigray’s leadership rearranged its schedule to receive him. It complained that Obasanjo had failed to return with meaningful results from earlier discussions held in June and said the August meeting produced no tangible improvement and no new proposal. This characterization is also reflected in subsequent reporting on the statement.
The Bureau instead reiterated five conditions Tigray’s leadership says it had presented during the June discussions as possible entry points for negotiations: lifting what it describes as the economic blockade and restrictions on Tigray; ending the military encirclement and reducing tensions; restoring what it describes as Tigray’s sovereign territory; returning displaced people to their homes safely and with dignity; and restoring the TPLF’s legal status.
The statement said Tigray’s leadership had no political appetite for another cycle of what it characterized as failed discussions and unimplemented promises. It nevertheless said it remained prepared for credible, concrete and time-bound negotiations backed by major international partners.
10. Between Addis Ababa and Asmara
Several sources inside Tigray told UMD Media that this leaves the leadership in an increasingly difficult position: how to reopen meaningful negotiations with the federal government without provoking Eritrea.
That dilemma could become particularly acute if the confidential message attributed to Obasanjo, that the TPLF should distance itself from Eritrea, accurately reflects the position of Washington and other international partners.
Three independent sources who spoke separately to UMD Media went further. They said some senior TPLF leaders increasingly view Eritrea’s political system under Isaias Afwerki as a model for maintaining power without meaningful internal challenge.
That is a particularly consequential allegation and UMD Media has not independently established the motivations attributed to individual TPLF leaders. But it echoes another concern emerging from highly placed sources: that the narrowing space for disagreement inside the TPLF, government and military leadership is not simply a temporary response to external threats but is increasingly becoming a method of political control.
The convergence of these developments therefore raises a larger question.
The Pretoria Agreement remains the principal formal political bridge between Tigray and the Ethiopian federal government. Western diplomats are now publicly urging both sides to preserve and implement that framework, while Obasanjo has returned to shuttle diplomacy amid renewed military tensions.
At the same time, the TPLF has moved rhetorically toward declaring diplomacy exhausted, deepened contacts with Eritrea and held dozens of forums in which senior leaders spoke about "burying" the Prosperity Party government.
If the Pretoria bridge is finally broken, the strategic consequences could therefore extend beyond another confrontation with Addis Ababa. Tigray could find itself more isolated internationally and more dependent on Eritrea precisely when Isaias would possess maximum leverage over its political and military choices.
For Tigray’s leadership, the emerging dilemma may therefore be stark: how to preserve the Eritrean relationship without losing the Pretoria framework and international diplomatic support, and how to return to negotiations with Addis Ababa without alienating the government in Asmara on which parts of its emerging military strategy may increasingly depend.
11. More Than an Organizational Dispute?
Taken together, these developments and the internal power struggle described to UMD Media point to something larger than personnel changes.
The reported appointment of new deputy front commanders, the strengthening of Wedi Embetey, the weakening of Fisseha Manjus’s operational authority, Amanuel Assefa’s role in pushing the new regulation, and the emergence of a closely coordinated political-military core all suggest an attempt, according to the interpretation of the sources, to create a more dependable command structure around Debretsion’s leadership.
The broader institutional problem may prove highly consequential.
Tigray faces mounting pressures on multiple fronts, renewed federal military pressure marked by repeated drone and air strikes, including strikes that have hit civilians and civilian infrastructure; territory that remains unrestored; a prolonged displacement crisis; and a worsening drought that has already begun killing livestock.
At the same time, it confronts a federal government that, in the view of many observers, possesses the capacity but has lacked the political willingness to ensure full implementation of the Pretoria Agreement, both by fulfilling its own obligations and by creating the conditions necessary to require and facilitate implementation of the TPLF’s corresponding commitments. Nearly four years after the agreement was signed, critical provisions remain unimplemented.
These challenges are unfolding alongside a highly uncertain relationship with Eritrea and the growing possibility of a wider war, at precisely the moment when, according to senior insiders, fear and self-censorship are eroding meaningful debate within the political and military institutions responsible for making Tigray’s most consequential decisions.
The combination of external military pressure, internal command rivalry and a political culture in which disagreement can be treated as betrayal creates a particularly dangerous environment.
In such a system, the question is no longer only who commands the army. It is also who is still able to question those who command it.
The international community should not wait for another full-scale war before acting. It should unequivocally condemn the federal government’s repeated drone and air strikes, particularly those affecting civilians and civilian infrastructure, and demand their immediate cessation. At the same time, it should press the TPLF not to initiate another war or pursue military escalation as an alternative to diplomacy. International partners have leverage over both sides and should use it urgently to push them back toward negotiations and full implementation of the Pretoria Agreement.
Equally urgent is the worsening drought. Humanitarian assistance must reach affected communities before livestock losses, hunger and displacement deepen into another preventable catastrophe. The priority must be clear: stop the strikes, prevent another war, implement Pretoria and save lives before it is too late.
Originally published on UMD Media Facebook on 2026-08-27T09:00:00-06:00. Source: https://www.facebook.com/getachew.UMDMedia
