𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑠 by Teshome Beyene
1) Assessing General Tadese Worede’s First 100 Days in Tigrai Leadership
General Tadese Worede stepped into the presidency of Tigrai at a challenging time, with many odds stacked against him. Unlike his predecessor Getachew Reda, Tadese was less popular among the people and was widely associated—rightly or wrongly—with the military’s effective sidelining of Getachew. Notably, he remained silent when top army commanders openly allied with Debretsion’s TPLF faction, a stance that cost him public trust. His long history within the TPLF also worked against him, raising doubts about whether he represented meaningful change.
That said, some observers offered him the benefit of the doubt. His existing experience within the government, his understanding of the TPLF’s internal workings, his calm and measured communication style, and his military background as a general were seen as potential strengths to leverage effective leadership.
His early days, however, were marked by a symbolic moment that did not inspire confidence: he was seen almost kneeling before Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, signing a terse eight-point “to-do list”—a visible sign of the limited autonomy he might have had.
With these caveats, we can cautiously observe a few achievements and ongoing challenges in his first 100 days. While this is a short period to pass a definitive judgment, certain trends are discernible.
Positives:
From the start, Tadese clearly articulated his priorities, openly demanding full implementation of the Pretoria Agreement. He made several public statements and stern written appeals to the federal government concerning the pact’s delays.
His conciliatory approach helped ease tensions. He traveled to Raya and successfully convinced local administrators to give him leadership time. Similarly, he worked to restore calm in Enderta, Shire, Axum, and Adwa, engaging with administrators and holding town hall meetings—an effort to reconnect with grassroots communities. This outreach showed an encouraging level of rapport with ordinary citizens and a willingness to listen—something his predecessor struggled to achieve.
His government sought to pacify armed groups in the Afar region opposing the TPLF, avoiding military confrontations—a signal that Tadese is not the belligerent hardliner some feared.
Efforts to restore law and order appear to be showing modest success, with a noted decline in rampant lawlessness, attributable in part to his administration’s work.
Depending on how much of the credit he may be given, Tigrai’s courts have demonstrated increasing independence—an encouraging trend. Courageous decisions were seen in high-profile cases such as Zewdi Haftu’s murder trial and the suspension of the Debretsion group’s attempt to subvert EFFORT into their political orbit. These moments indicate that the judiciary is beginning to act autonomously, despite political pressure.
Tadese does not make grandiose promises nor engage in divisive rhetoric. Unlike his predecessor, he avoids being hostage to his own words, which may provide some political flexibility.
Concerns:
His cabinet lacks sufficient inclusivity. The once hopeful Advisory Council seems sidelined and ineffective.
Key TPLF stalwarts, including Alem Gebrewhaid, are included in cabinet positions, raising questions about how much genuine change is underway.
Crucially, Tadese has not clearly articulated a roadmap toward democratic governance or elections in Tigrai. This silence creates uncertainty about Tigrai’s political future under his leadership. He has not offered public assurances that institutions—like the courts, civic organizations, or the Tigray Development Association (TDA), which the Debretsion group nearly hijacked—will be protected from partisan control. His government has yet to speak out in defense of institutional independence.
Many in the military and government openly voice opinions and make statements without apparent correction or guidance from Tadese, suggesting he is viewed more as a peer than as a decisive leader.
Figures like Fetlework Gebreegizabher remain vocally active, and Tadese has not publicly opposed the clandestine launch of “tsimdo” nor addressed the complexities and risks of such activities. Eritrea’s territorial occupation is still untouched as a subject, despite the music “tsimdo” being sung by some TPLF associates. About this, allegations of illicit cargo movements from Tigrai to Eritrea, including petroleum, are not addressed.
No visible accountability measures have been taken against corruption or the plunder of minerals. Moreover, Tadese has not been seen publicly challenging the TPLF on any major points of contention, raising concern that, while his tone is different, his government may still be operating in continuity with the old order.
Summary:
General Tadese Worede’s gentle, non-confrontational leadership style and focus on administrative governance could yield positive results for Tigrai. His calm demeanor, grassroots engagement, and tolerance for judicial independence mark encouraging signs. However, his slow pace, reluctance to assert positions on core issues, and silence on the need for democratic reform limit public confidence. Without a clearer break from the past or stronger stands on institutional autonomy, the hope for a more inclusive, accountable Tigrai under his leadership remains uncertain.
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2) Recent Developments in the EFFORT Leadership Dispute
Last week, I shared an in-depth analysis of the turmoil engulfing EFFORT, stemming from the controversial claims by the Debretsion group over the leadership of this influential conglomerate. This faction had orchestrated a questionable assembly meeting, aiming to consolidate control over EFFORT’s institutions.
Debretsion and his allies appear determined to bring all key institutions in Tigrai firmly under their jurisdiction, sidelining established governance processes. The legality of their actions vis-à-vis EFFORT faced strong opposition from notable figures such as Tewodros Hagos and Tsegay Berhe, who challenged the legitimacy of the assembly’s decision to appoint new board members. Earlier, Tewodros Hagos had circulated a letter to all management and staff calling the new electee and the new acting CEO unlawful usurpers.
The dispute quickly escalated to the regional Justice Bureau, where significant developments unfolded this week. The Justice Department decisively annulled the election of Debretsion’s group as new board members. Further reinforcing this decision, the Court, acting on an injunction filed by Tewodros and his supporters, suspended the authority of Debretsion and his faction, affirming the Justice Department’s ruling.
In a bold yet audacious move, Debretsion and his group called on assembly members to petition for a reconvening of the assembly. This meeting is currently underway, purportedly having met the procedural requirements outlined in EFFORT’s bylaws. Remarkably, this is occurring despite the Court’s prior ruling that invalidated the same assembly’s earlier decisions as unlawful.
The unrelenting efforts of Debretsion, Abreham Tekeste, Addis Alem Balema, Kinfe Dagnew, and their associates represent yet another attempt to seize control of Tigrean institutions for narrow, power-driven ambitions. Their actions not only undermine institutional integrity but also threaten the broader governance and stability of the region.
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3) Shimglina or Shadow Play? Abiy’s Tactics and Tigray’s Dilemma
This week has seen a flurry of diplomatic activity between Addis Ababa and Mekelle, following a familiar and somewhat worn-out pattern. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, standing before parliament, issued a grim warning that any renewed war in Tigray would bring devastation—that it would claim the lives of mothers and children, and destroy what remains of the state. But in the same breath, he pivoted to say that mediators—Ethiopia’s traditional shimagles’—should go to Tigray to speak with the “war mongers” there, to reason with them about the futility of war, and to warn them they have everything to lose.
And so, as expected, a procession of shimaglé—comprising civic leaders, religious figures from the churches and mosques, and prominent civil society actors—set out for Mekelle. Their mission: to meet with the Tigrayan leadership, including Debretsion Gebremichael, Amanuel Assefa, and General Tadesse Worede. The details of their discussions have not been made public, but reliable sources suggest that the Tigray side articulated its frustrations at length over the non-implementation of the Pretoria Agreement, the displacement of over a million people, and the broader plight of the region.
That said, the Tigrayan authorities missed a crucial opportunity. Perhaps, the Shimagles were not in the mood to visit the over million who had been displaced and are wallowing in suffering, and to other similar sites of devastation. Showing the human cost firsthand could have strengthened the mediators’ understanding and helped convey the urgency more powerfully. Unfortunately, it appears that such visits were not arranged, leaving a painful gap between testimony and visual evidence.
After the visit, the shimagles’ returned to Addis Ababa and met once again with Abiy Ahmed to debrief him. What remains unclear, however, is how forcefully or faithfully they relayed Tigray’s demands and grievances. What also stands out this time is the absence of high-profile personalities such as Haile Gebrselassie or Professor Mesfin Araya, who had accompanied similar missions in the past.
Not long ago, religious representatives from Tigray also traveled to Addis to plead directly with the Prime Minister on the pressing need for the return of displaced people and the restoration of territorial sovereignty. Abiy may have listened to this carefully, judging from the past, but experience shows that he ultimately sticks to his course, calculated, measured, and deeply attuned to narrative control.
Indeed, Abiy is, in truth, the more hawkish and belligerent actor in this political theater, but he has mastered the art of turning the tables, casting himself as the peacemaker while painting his adversaries as the ones thirsting for war. His talent for crafting a persuasive public image is not to be underestimated. He is so cunning that he even received a Nobel Peace Prize at a time when he was clandestinely preparing for war in Tigray in collaboration with Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki. It was, in hindsight, one of the most ironic moments in recent diplomatic history.
Like many observers, I share the growing belief that this so-called “shimglina” diplomacy is a well-rehearsed tactic—a political maneuver designed not to solve problems, but to buy time, paint himself as the ever-reasonable peacemaker, and subtly portray his adversaries as the ones itching for war. This narrative benefits Abiy, not because it’s true, but because it shifts public perception.
On the Tigrayan side, the response has been less calculated, more reactive. One cannot help but notice the disjointed communication. While welcoming the shimagle delegation, some Tigrayan generals appeared on camera saying they were preparing—if not prepared—for war, citing Abiy’s growing threats and refusal to respect the Pretoria Agreement. Their tone was not one of bravado, but of guarded readiness. Still, the public visibility of military preparations, including parading troops and open declarations, raises critical questions:
Is this out of desperation, miscalculation, or an earnest warning?
Should such declarations be made in front of a camera, or would silence have carried more strength?
Abiy, for all his faults—and there are many—flaunts military power on television only when that serves him well. He prefers to make a thinly veiled message in parliament. He understands the power of subtlety and spectacle, and how to project strength without overexposing.
All that said, it must be emphasized: Tigray has every right to demand the restoration of its territorial sovereignty and the return of its displaced citizens. These are legitimate, non-negotiable demands. But they must not be tied to the machinery of war, nor should they be articulated through military pageantry. Tigray is still healing from deep scars, and the appetite for conflict is minimal—unless provoked, and even then, only in defense of dignity and survival.
In times like these, the challenge is not just to demand justice, but to demand it wisely. Tigray must respond with strategy, not just sentiment. In the complex chessboard of power, those who calculate quietly often win the longer game.
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4) Isaias Afeworki’s Ramblings and His Growing Irrelevance to Eritrea and Tigrai
The life-long President of Eritrea, once pampered by his people as “Wedi-Afom”, is now increasingly viewed with disdain, even among his ranks. In the interview he gave on 19 July 2025, true to form, he delivered one of his usual long-winded tirades, meandering through global, regional, and Ethiopian affairs. In the past, Isaias at least paid lip service to Eritrean matters, albeit marginally. This time, however, he didn’t even bother to make that pretense. When the journalist tried to pivot the discussion to Eritrean issues, Isaias curtly responded: “Let us call it an interview; you’ve already used close to two hours.” It was a blunt dismissal—almost an admission that he had nothing meaningful to offer his people.
More striking, however, was his appearance: for the first time, Isaias was visibly frail. I believe age is finally taking its toll on him. The once fiery and domineering speaker seemed weighed down, not just by time, but by the emptiness of his record.
What could he say anyway? Eritrea today is a land of suffering, repression, and stifled dreams. There’s nothing uplifting he can offer. So he speaks instead of the world, while Eritreans continue to live in hardship.
In his trademark undiplomatic style—something he bizarrely seems to take pride in—Isaias lambasted his once-favored ally Abiy Ahmed, using a barrage of insults only he can string together. He called Abiy “childish,” “pretentious,” “a liar,” and “incompetent.” He accused him of derailing what once appeared to be a promising partnership—a reference to the Pretoria peace deal, which Isaias claims was signed without his advice and against his wishes.
Consistent with his long-standing position, Isaias conveyed frustration—whether directly or through clear implication—that Tigrai was not crushed, that the TPLF veterans were not eliminated, and that the Tigrean political force was not erased from Ethiopia’s future. His words, even if indirect, betray a deep dissatisfaction that the war didn’t end the way he had hoped.
Interestingly, throughout his 100-minute monologue, he mentioned Tigrai or the TPLF only scantily, even while commenting on Ethiopia and the region at large. Whether that omission was deliberate or instinctive, it suggested an attempt to downplay Tigrai’s relevance, at least in his public rhetoric.
To the remaining hopefuls advocating for “ጽምዶ”— it officially means cooperation and unity between the peoples of Tigrai and Eritrea—this should serve as a wake-up call. The final nail in the coffin of their aspirations. If this speech makes anything clear, it’s that the Eritrean government under Isaias is neither a partner nor a friend to Tigrai.
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5) Getachew Reda’s U.S. Visit: A Time for Questions, Not Withdrawal
Getachew Reda, former President of the Interim Government of Tigrai and currently serving as the Prime Minister’s Advisor on East African Affairs, is now headed to the United States—this time for a town hall meeting with Tigrean residents of Seattle and other guests from across the U.S., scheduled for 26 July.
Since he departed from regional leadership, Getachew has kept a highly visible profile—frequently travelling within and beyond Ethiopia, including to Humera, Sudan, and other regions. He has also been seen comfortably positioned among prominent Prosperity Party figures such as Shimelis Abdissa, Redwan Hussien, and Foreign Minister Gedeon. The optics suggest that a once-suspended alliance may now be quietly rekindled.
Alongside these movements, Getachew has made repeated media appearances, sharply criticizing the leadership of Tigrai under Debretsion Gebremichael. He has condemned what he views as the capture of Tigrai by narrow interests, the deepening corruption, and the lack of vision among its current leaders. Many Tigreans believe him, or at least believe that his critiques reflect lived truths.
Yet others see his tone as driven more by resentment than reason. Though his assessments often ring true, his messaging has, at times, lacked restraint and dignity. I believe he spoke too much, too soon—sharing personal stories, naming individuals, and occasionally trivializing events that should have been treated with greater seriousness.
What unsettles most is his seeming attempt to soften the image of Abiy Ahmed. In several of his recent statements, Getachew appeared to shift some blame away from Abiy, and at times even praised his leadership. That irony is hard to miss: the man who once bitterly opposed Abiy is now presenting him as a partner of sorts. It may reflect political pragmatism, but it’s a bitter pill for many to swallow.
Even though the Tigrean military establishment bears much of the blame for derailing democracy in the region, Getachew’s leadership during his interim presidency lacked firmness. He failed to distinguish himself early enough from the TPLF’s political machinery, and he did not harness the popular support that could have positioned him as a transformative figure.
That said, his appearance in Seattle is not entirely unexpected. A public meeting with the diaspora serves both political and strategic purposes. He may be laying the groundwork for a new chapter or political formation. That’s within his rights.
But here is my view—and a modest appeal to the diaspora community: Do not stay away. That, too, is not politics. You supported him once; now you have the right—and responsibility—to question him directly. Attend the meeting. Grill him. Ask the hard questions. Hold him to account. Demand clarity on where he stands and whether his recent alliances and public messages truly reflect the interests of Tigrai. Make sure he knows the people are still watching, still thinking, and still demanding integrity. Please also give him credit where it is due: praise his principled stand on Western Tigrai and the right of the Tigrean people to defend themselves against occupation at the beginning of the war. On that front, at least, he has not wavered.