Is the Eritrean Government Using Tigray as an Area-Denial Strategy Under the Pretext of Reengaging TPLF Hardliners?

Introduction

The geopolitical chessboard of the Horn of Africa is once again being reshaped, as the Eritrean government signals overtures toward remnants of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). This move, framed in the guise of reconciliation, raises questions about Eritrea’s strategic intent—particularly whether it seeks to use Tigray as an area-denial capability to shield itself from renewed Ethiopian pressures over the Red Sea and regional influence. This article explores the global history of area-denial strategies, Eritrea’s past experience with such tactics, the evolving tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and how these dynamics could impact Tigray’s recovery, stability, and long-term security.

World Historical Context: Area Denial Capability Strategies

Area-denial strategies have long been a central feature in international military history, designed to prevent adversaries from occupying or operating in strategic regions (Freedman, 2014). These tactics often intertwine military strength, political maneuvering, and physical infrastructure to create zones that are effectively off-limits or fraught with danger for opposing forces.

A notable example is the Soviet Union’s use of buffer zones during the Cold War. By maintaining satellite states in Eastern Europe, including East Germany and Poland, the Soviets created a ring of heavily militarized and politically aligned territories (Freedman, 2014).

China’s strategy in the South China Sea offers a modern iteration of area denial. By constructing artificial islands fortified with advanced missile systems, airstrips, and naval forces, Beijing has effectively asserted control over contested waters (Healy, 2008).

The Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) stands as a stark example of area denial in a land-based context, deterring incursions and maintaining a delicate military balance on the peninsula (Freedman, 2014).

During the Vietnam War, the Viet Cong employed a guerrilla version of area denial through the use of minefields, booby traps, and fortified jungle strongholds, demonstrating the human and financial toll of these tactics (Freedman, 2014).

EPLF’s Experiences in Area Denial

The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), which evolved into the current Eritrean government, extensively employed area-denial tactics during its decades-long struggle for independence from Ethiopia between 1961 and 1991. These strategies were not merely reactive but formed the backbone of EPLF’s military doctrine, designed to offset Ethiopia’s conventional superiority and gain strategic advantages in critical regions.

A prime example of this approach was the transformation of the Sahel mountains into formidable strongholds. EPLF fighters converted this rugged terrain into a labyrinth of tunnels, trenches, and fortifications, which, when combined with their adept use of guerrilla warfare, rendered Ethiopian military advances both costly and often futile. The natural barriers of the mountains, enhanced by human ingenuity, created a defensive network that proved nearly impenetrable.

Landmines further amplified this area-denial strategy. EPLF forces heavily mined key strategic areas, particularly around Nakfa, which served as a symbolic and practical center of resistance. These minefields not only inflicted significant casualties on advancing Ethiopian forces but also rendered entire regions impassable for mechanized units, effectively neutralizing superior Ethiopian firepower and mobility.

After Eritrea achieved independence in 1993, the government continued to rely on area-denial tactics as a cornerstone of its national security strategy. The highly militarized posture along its borders, particularly in areas like Badme, was a continuation of the EPLF’s defensive approach. Eritrea also actively supported insurgent groups in neighboring Ethiopia and Sudan, leveraging these local actors to destabilize border regions and create buffer zones that enhanced Eritrea’s strategic depth.

Collectively, these tactics have deeply embedded area denial into Eritrean military doctrine. By emphasizing control over geographic chokepoints and leveraging local actors for tactical advantage, Eritrea has crafted a defensive strategy that combines geography, infrastructure, and asymmetrical warfare to secure its borders and influence its neighbors.

Current War Tensions Between Ethiopia and Eritrea

The Red Sea region is rapidly becoming a focal point of emerging geopolitical tensions, with Ethiopia’s aspirations for direct port access at the center (UN Security Council Reports, 2023). Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has emphasized this need, while Eritrea’s defensive posture, shaped by past conflicts and isolation, deepens its insecurity (Plaut, 2016; International Crisis Group, 2023).

Recent satellite imagery reveals expanded military build-ups along contentious border regions (UN Security Council Reports, 2023). Eritrea’s reported reengagement with TPLF diehards in Tigray suggests a strategy of proxy alignments to counter Ethiopian pressure (International Crisis Group, 2023).

Analysis of the New Reengagement: The ፅምዶ Dynamic

The Eritrean government’s recent outreach to factions within the TPLF, under the banner of “ፅምዶ” (a term symbolizing unity or reconciliation), may conceal deeper and more troubling strategic motives. This apparent olive branch is not solely about mending relations; rather, it could represent a calculated effort to destabilize the broader region. Ironically, while extending this gesture of reconciliation, the Eritrean government continues to occupy Tigray’s sovereign territories, including Badme and Irob. Simultaneously, President Isaias has made it unequivocally clear that he harbors no regrets for the actions of Eritrean forces during the 2021–2022 genocidal war, which they conducted in alliance with the Ethiopian government against Tigray.

By backing disaffected TPLF elements, Eritrea could incite unrest in northern Ethiopia, thereby complicating Addis Ababa’s military and political calculations. This tactic, reminiscent of past power plays, appears aimed at dismantling the Pretoria Agreement and transforming Tigray into a strategic pressure point, diverting and weakening the central Ethiopian government’s focus on Red Sea priorities.

Another possible motive is the creation of a buffer zone. By encouraging instability within Tigray, Eritrea could insulate itself from potential Ethiopian military advances. This echoes tactics employed by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) during past conflicts, where chaos on the border served as a defensive shield for Eritrean interests.

Moreover, the Eritrean strategy risks deepening internal divisions within Tigray. As rival factions vie for power, the region’s social and political cohesion could fragment further, undermining efforts at recovery and reconciliation. This would not only weaken Tigray’s ability to govern itself effectively but also leave it vulnerable to future manipulation and exploitation.

Concrete examples of these maneuvers have begun to surface, with reports of secret meetings between Eritrean operatives and radicalized TPLF remnants. Financial and logistical support for these elements could escalate localized conflicts, turning isolated tensions into broader security crises. In sum, Eritrea’s engagement with TPLF factions under the pretext of “ፅምዶ” may be less about reconciliation and more about leveraging division to advance its own regional interests.

These assertions are supported by reports from credible sources. A report by Africa Intelligence in February 2025 indicated that senior members of the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF) had been increasing contacts with Eritrean officers, culminating in a confidential meeting in Asmara in late January. During this meeting, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki reportedly assured TDF officers of his protection in the event of a conflict with Ethiopia. Additionally, a report by the Clingendael Institute in March 2025 highlighted secret engagements between the TPLF’s old guard, backed by a group of security force leaders, and the Eritrean government.

Although the chairman of the TPLF, in his speech at the inauguration of ግንቦት 20, signaled the importance of ፅምዶ (symbolizing reconciliation) with Eritrea—recalling the former alliance between the TPLF and EPLF that played a crucial role in toppling the Derg regime—he also suggested that a similar unity could be valuable today to confront common challenges. However, the TPLF has publicly rejected claims of secret talks with Eritrea, calling the accusations “fabricated falsehoods” intended to undermine the Pretoria Agreement.

These developments suggest that Eritrea’s engagement with TPLF factions under the pretext of “ፅምዶ” may be less about reconciliation and more about leveraging division to advance its own regional interests.

Consequences on Tigray’s Interests

If Tigray is co-opted into Eritrea’s strategic calculations, the consequences could be severe and far-reaching. One of the most immediate risks is the loss of autonomy, as Eritrean manipulation could derail Tigray’s pursuit of genuine self-determination and democratic governance. Instead of building a future shaped by its people’s aspirations, Tigray could find itself trapped in a cycle of external interference and internal instability.

The humanitarian situation in Tigray, already fragile, would likely deteriorate further under such circumstances. Renewed conflicts would exacerbate displacement, deepen malnutrition, and heighten the risk of disease outbreaks. With critical resources stretched thin and humanitarian actors facing restricted access, the lives of countless civilians could be placed in grave jeopardy.

Tigray’s geopolitical standing would also be jeopardized. Undermining the Pretoria Agreement and aligning with Eritrea risk alienating key regional actors such as the African Union, as well as influential international players like the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States. This geopolitical isolation could deprive Tigray of critical diplomatic and economic support, severely weakening its ability to navigate the region’s complex dynamics.

Economically, the costs would be devastating. Instability and conflict would deter much-needed investment, disrupt reconstruction efforts, and deepen poverty levels. Tigray’s efforts to rebuild its economy and restore essential services would be severely undermined, leaving its people trapped in a cycle of hardship and dependency.

Actions to Revert Eritrea’s ill Intentions

Tigray’s leaders must take a clear and unequivocal stance against any clandestine dealings with the Eritrean government, making a public denunciation that underscores Tigray’s commitment to sovereignty, stability, and peace. This public rejection of secretive engagements will send a strong message to both internal and external audiences that Tigray stands firm against external manipulation and interference.

Rebuilding unity within Tigray is crucial for long-term peace and prosperity. Leaders must prioritize internal reconciliation by addressing the lingering grievances from the past history and the recent war, fostering inclusive governance, and creating a shared national vision that binds the diverse segments of society. This collective healing will lay the groundwork for a more resilient and united Tigray.

Strategic diplomacy is essential for Tigray’s reintegration into broader regional frameworks. Reengagement with Addis Ababa and other regional actors should focus on rebuilding trust through the pursuit of justice and genuine political dialogue, while seeking mutually beneficial agreements that promote stability and open new avenues for cooperation. Such diplomacy will not only enhance Tigray’s political standing but also provide critical economic and security benefits, fostering a conducive environment for pursuing self-determination through peaceful and legal means, including a referendum.

Tigray must also seek robust international support to counter potential Eritrean interference. By actively engaging the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and global partners, Tigray can build a coalition that deters external aggression and supports its aspirations for peace and sovereignty.

A comprehensive overhaul of security structures is equally essential. Strengthening regional defense systems and bolstering community policing will safeguard Tigray from proxy infiltration and ensure the stability and safety of its population. This security transformation should be designed to protect local communities while upholding democratic principles.

Finally, Tigray should launch public awareness campaigns aimed at educating its citizens about the dangers of external manipulation and the importance of national healing. By fostering an informed and vigilant populace, Tigray can build resilience against external threats and solidify its path toward lasting peace and self-determination.

Tigray’s Path Forward: Neutrality and National Healing

In the event of renewed hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Tigray must adopt a firm stance of neutrality, focusing its energies inward to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons and the restoration of its sovereign territories in line with the Pretoria Agreement. This approach requires prioritizing healing and reconstruction, addressing the deep-seated traumas left by years of conflict, and fostering social cohesion as the foundation for a resilient and united society.

Inclusive governance should serve as a cornerstone of this recovery process, ensuring the establishment of participatory and accountable institutions that can unite diverse communities and create a sense of shared destiny. By embracing a model of governance that listens to the voices of all citizens, Tigray can foster a more stable and prosperous future.

Equally crucial is the revitalization of the economy. Tigray must mobilize both domestic resources and international support to rebuild its essential infrastructure, including roads, schools, and healthcare facilities. These investments will not only improve the quality of life for its citizens but also create opportunities for long-term economic growth and stability.

Civic engagement is another vital pillar of this strategy. By empowering local communities to lead peacebuilding initiatives and resist divisive narratives, Tigray can ensure that peace and unity are not merely imposed from above but are deeply rooted in the society’s fabric.

Finally, Tigray must adopt a proactive and strategic communication approach to clearly articulate its neutral stance to both regional and global audiences. By doing so, it can position itself as a stabilizing force in the region, committed to healing, rebuilding, and fostering lasting peace, rather than being manipulated as a pawn in broader geopolitical conflicts.

Conclusion

The Eritrean government’s overtures to TPLF diehards under the banner of “ፅምዶ” likely conceal strategic intentions to use Tigray as a buffer zone against Ethiopian ambitions. Tigray must avoid becoming entangled in external rivalries and focus on national healing, unity, and reconstruction. By asserting its neutrality and engaging with international partners, Tigray can safeguard its future and contribute to regional stability.

References

1. Freedman, L. (2014). Strategy: A History. Oxford University Press.
2. International Crisis Group. (2023). Eritrea: The Shadow Player in the Horn of Africa.
3. Plaut, M. (2016). Understanding Eritrea: Inside Africa’s Most Repressive State. Hurst.
4. Healy, S. (2008). Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel. Chatham House.
5. UN Security Council Reports. (2023). Developments in the Horn of Africa.
6. Human Rights Watch. (2024). Tigray: Devastation and Recovery in the Aftermath of Conflict.
7. African Union. (2024). Peace and Security in the Horn of Africa: A Policy Paper.
8. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). (2024). Tigray Humanitarian Response Plan.