๐๐๐ค๐ ๐๐๐ ๐๐๐๐ ๐๐๐๐ ๐๐๐๐ค๐ by Teshome Beyene
This week, we will take a close look at three significant issues. Last week, we touched on the arrest of prominent activist Berhane Gebregregis and his subsequent release. This week, notably, neither President Tadese nor his subordinates addressed the incident โ a clear overreach of authority that the government has seemingly chosen to ignore. Another troubling sign for the future.
๐๐๐๐
๐๐๐ฆ๐จ๐ฏ๐๐ ๐๐ซ๐จ๐ฆ ๐๐๐ซ๐ญ๐ฒ ๐๐๐ ๐ข๐ฌ๐ญ๐ซ๐ฒ: ๐๐ก๐๐ญ ๐๐จ๐๐ฌ ๐๐ญ ๐๐๐๐ฅ๐ฅ๐ฒ ๐๐๐๐ง?
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Itโs a striking twist โ the TPLF, marking its 50th anniversary this year, has been declared null and void by the Election Board.
For some, itโs a moment to celebrate, a long-awaited blow to a party they view as a relic โ a repressive force that brought havoc to Tigray. For others, itโs unsettling news, or perhaps just another bump in a long, complicated road.
But letโs take a step back. This isn’t about celebrating or condemning the TPLF. Itโs about principles and legality. As Debretsion Gebremichael (Dr) pointed out in a recent interview, the partyโs operating license was revoked in January 2021 and has never been reinstated. So, is this really a game-changing development? Maybe not โ unless weโre talking about the next elections in 2026.
Also, letโs not forget the Pretoria Agreement of 2022, which effectively sanctioned the TPLFโs current standing. The Agreement, signed by both the Ethiopian government and the TPLF, granted the party a political space to operate โ a point that cannot be altered by the Election Boardโs decision. If any change is to occur, it should be through political negotiations, not by administrative fiat.
Meanwhile, the TPLFโs own internal struggles canโt be ignored. Its August 2024 congress was a mess: the Audit Committee refused to endorse it, key members of the Preparatory Committee resigned, over a third of the Central Committee walked away, and many delegates abstained.
So, if the TPLF is to be countenanced, it should be for these glaring internal issues โ not for its โmisdeedsโ in relation to the war, and the revocation of its license in the past. This is my honest take.
๐๐ก๐๐ญ๐๐ฏ๐๐ซ ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐๐๐๐
๐ข๐ฌ ๐ฐ๐จ๐ซ๐ญ๐ก, ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐ฉ๐๐จ๐ฉ๐ฅ๐ ๐จ๐ ๐๐ข๐ ๐ซ๐๐ฒ ๐ฐ๐ข๐ฅ๐ฅ ๐๐๐๐ข๐๐ ๐ข๐ญ๐ฌ ๐๐๐ญ๐. Already, through peaceful means, the youth are making their own choices. The duty of the Election Board should be to ensure a level playing field in Tigray so that other voices can compete for political power fairly and freely โ and banning should be off the table.
Finally, talking about the Election Board, it is important to remind oneself this is the same body that approved the Prosperity Party in 2020 as a new party despite its failure to conduct a proper congress. Such selective enforcement raises questions about its moral authority to ban the TPLF now.
๐ฎ๐๐๐๐๐๐๐ ๐น๐๐
๐โ๐ ๐ฉ๐๐๐๐๐ ๐ช๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐ ๐๐ ๐ฏ๐๐ ๐ญ๐๐๐๐๐ ๐ช๐๐๐๐๐
๐๐: ๐พ๐๐๐ ๐๐๐ ๐๐๐ ๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐ ๐๐ ๐๐๐?
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Getachew Reda has taken a surprising turn in openly criticizing the leadership of the party he once staunchly defended for over a decade. Having been a prominent spokesperson and an ardent advocate of its policies, his current stance carries weight.
In a recent interview on โFana TV,โ Getachew spoke about corruption, war crimes, and hypocrisy among party leaders and TDF generals. His tone was forthright and, at times personal, more so than in previous appearances.
Interestingly, while he was unsparing in his critique of his former comrades, Getachew appeared to soften his stance on Abiy Ahmedโs government, downplaying its role in the conflict and other contentious issues.
Getachewโs comments suggest a complex personal and political battle. In any case, the points he raised cannot be dismissed easily, as concerns about corruption and authoritarianism within the TPLF have been widely acknowledged. Nonetheless, several key questions emerge:
1. Corruption Allegations: Since the TPLFโs return in 2022, rumors of corruption โ from misappropriated aid grain to illegal mining and the sale of war materials โ have been widespread. Itโs said that reports detailing these claims were presented to Getachew, given his role in overseeing law and order. Why then did he not initiate legal action?
2. Evidence Presentation: Getachew has asserted that he has documentation to back up his claims. Sharing it โ whether with the public or through legal channels โ would lend credibility to his assertions. Otherwise, his statements risk being perceived as politically motivated. Six years ago, he claimed to have evidence against Abiy Ahmed (Dr). That evidence was never produced. What assurances are there that he will follow through this time?
3. Staying in Leadership: If Getachew was genuinely troubled by what he witnessed within the party, why did he remain in a position of power for so long? Was there an opportunity to confront these issues internally? Perhaps stepping away earlier and establishing a new political path would have underscored his resolve. And if that meant losing his leadership post, it might not have been the end of his political influence.
4. Selective Criticism: Getachewโs criticism has largely focused on his nemesis, while remaining noticeably silent about those within his current circle who have also been implicated in allegations of wrongdoing. This uneven approach raises questions about his intentions and whether his grievances are selectively targeted.
Some observers have pointed to the frequency of his media appearances, suggesting they might dilute his message or appear opportunistic. However, that is secondary to the substantive issues he has raised.
Despite the apparent contradictions, Getachew continues to project himself as a determined voice against corruption. Yet, his alignment with Abiy Ahmedโs administration, where corruption is growing unchecked, complicates the narrative. How does he reconcile his declared stance against corruption with the realities of the current government?
๐๐ฌ ๐๐ฑ๐ฉ๐๐๐ญ๐๐, ๐๐๐ญ๐๐๐ก๐๐ฐ ๐๐ข๐ ๐๐ฑ๐ฉ๐ซ๐๐ฌ๐ฌ ๐๐ฆ๐จ๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐จ๐ฏ๐๐ซ ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐ฌ๐ฎ๐๐๐๐ซ๐ข๐ง๐ ๐จ๐ ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐ฉ๐๐จ๐ฉ๐ฅ๐ ๐จ๐ ๐๐ข๐ ๐ซ๐๐ฒ. ๐๐ ๐๐๐ค๐ง๐จ๐ฐ๐ฅ๐๐๐ ๐๐ ๐ฉ๐๐ซ๐ฌ๐จ๐ง๐๐ฅ ๐ซ๐๐ฌ๐ฉ๐จ๐ง๐ฌ๐ข๐๐ข๐ฅ๐ข๐ญ๐ฒ ๐๐จ๐ซ ๐๐๐ข๐ง๐ ๐ฉ๐๐ซ๐ญ ๐จ๐ ๐ ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐๐ซ๐ฌ๐ก๐ข๐ฉ ๐ญ๐ก๐๐ญ ๐๐จ๐ง๐ญ๐ซ๐ข๐๐ฎ๐ญ๐๐ ๐ญ๐จ ๐ญ๐ก๐๐ข๐ซ ๐ก๐๐ซ๐๐ฌ๐ก๐ข๐ฉ. He also reaffirmed his commitment to the Pretoria Agreement, particularly emphasizing the return of displaced people and respect for Tigrayโs sovereignty โ a stance that suggests he is still seeking to maintain alignment with broader peace efforts.
๐ซ๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐โ๐ ๐ฐ๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐: ๐ป๐๐๐๐๐, ๐ฌ๐๐๐๐๐๐, ๐๐๐
๐๐๐ ๐บ๐๐๐๐๐๐๐ ๐น๐๐๐
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Debretsion Gebremichael delivered a measured and carefully calibrated interview this week to Woyin Media, speaking for over an hour. Debretsionโs composure reflects the TPLFโs recently growing self-assurance and evident confidence, a boldness that clearly stems from the backing of the Tigrayan military or/and perhaps from the alleged simmering alliance with the EPLF.
Debretsion addressed four key topics: the state of party-government relations in Tigray, including regional divisions; the potential revocation of TPLFโs operating license; relations with Eritrea; and the situation in South Tigray. Throughout, he intertwined these issues with reflections on the Pretoria Agreement.
Debretsion asserted that the current Tigray President, General Tadese Woreda, was the TPLFโs chosen nominee and that the party is working with him seamlessly. He alluded to Getachew Reda and associates (without naming them) as national traitors, suggesting that their departure was a positive outcome for Tigray. His portrayal of them was heavily charged, using every hyperbolic tool to cast them in a starkly negative light.
A notable takeaway from the interview is Debretsionโs emphasis on the urgency of restoring Tigrayโs sovereignty and the return of displaced people. He underscored that these issues demand immediate attention, though he acknowledged that achieving them would require a tripartite action involving the TPLF, the federal government, and the African Union high-level mediators.
Debretsion stated that he seeks to build peace with all neighbors, including Eritrea. He emphasized the importance of building peaceful relations with Eritrea, without denying that dialogue with Eritrea is ongoing. Notably, he did not address the extensive destruction and atrocities committed by Eritrean forces in Tigray, nor did he mention their continued occupation of Tigrayan/Ethiopian territory. However, he spoke vehemently about the occupation of western Tigray, a point he underscored with urgency.
On South Tigray, he acknowledged that the regional leadership had strayed from the partyโs rule and was now acting against the TPLFโs line. Yet, he claimed โ somewhat implausibly โ that the people in the South were yearning for the partyโs return, a remark that added a note of irony to his speech. He went further, declaring that the party will move into the South, a statement that implies even coercion.
However, the reality on the ground tells a different story. The South remains vocal in its demands for self-determination and self-elected leaders, firmly resisting what it believes to be TPLF-imposed governance. Following Debretsionโs statement, a large mass rally was held in Maichew town, a clear rebuke of his assertion of entitlement to the South and a response to his suggestion of a party comeback.
๐
๐จ๐ซ ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐๐จ๐ฎ๐ญ๐ก, ๐ญ๐ก๐ difference ๐ฐ๐ข๐ญ๐ก ๐ญ๐ก๐ ๐๐๐๐
๐ข๐ฌ ๐ง๐จ๐ญ ๐๐ซ๐๐ฆ๐๐ ๐๐ฌ ๐ ๐ฌ๐๐ฉ๐๐ซ๐๐ญ๐ข๐ฌ๐ญ ๐๐ ๐๐ง๐๐ ๐๐ญ ๐๐ฅ๐ฅ ๐๐ฎ๐ญ ๐๐ฌ ๐ ๐๐๐ฆ๐๐ง๐ ๐๐จ๐ซ ๐ ๐๐ง๐ฎ๐ข๐ง๐ ๐ซ๐๐ฉ๐ซ๐๐ฌ๐๐ง๐ญ๐๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐๐ง๐ ๐๐ซ๐๐๐๐จ๐ฆ ๐๐ซ๐จ๐ฆ ๐ฉ๐๐ซ๐ญ๐ฒ-๐๐๐ฌ๐๐ ๐ซ๐๐ฉ๐ซ๐๐ฌ๐ฌ๐ข๐จ๐งโ a call that is presumed to be shared by other regions with differing intensity.
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